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Abstract 
This work is concerned with the application of game-theoretic principles to model competition between demand response 
aggregators for selling excess energy stored in electrochemical storage devices directly to other aggregators in a power 
market. This market framework is presented as an alternative to the traditional vertically-integrated market structure, 
which may be better suited for developing demand response and smart-grid technologies, in addition to increasing 
penetration of independent renewable energy generation devices. Demand for power generated by the utility through 
combustion of fuel could be replaced, lowering emission of pollutants, when the energy used to charge the batteries is 
produced sustainably and traded on smaller scales. The four variants of game are considered: both non-cooperative 
(unregulated competition) and Stackelberg (regulations on transaction price and size), each with and without DR 
scheduling. The Nash equilibrium is derived for each game variant in order to serve as a bid-price decision making criteria 
which determines the optimal bidding strategy for an aggregator to sell in the market. The model is applied to a case study 
involving completion for selling between two aggregators. Bidding strategy is dependent on parameters inherent to an 
aggregator’s energy storage hardware, and the strategy selected by each aggregator does not vary with the variations in 
the game conditions considered. Demand response scheduling offers greater payoff for aggregators who implement it, 
compared with those who do not. Addition of transaction price and volume regulations to the market do not affect the 
participants optimal bidding strategies (the Nash equilibrium), but lowers payoffs for all aggregators participating in the 
market relative to unregulated competition. 
Index Terms: Demand Response Aggregator (DRA), Game theory, Non-cooperative game, Stackelberg game, Demand 
response scheduling, Nash equilibrium 
 
1. Introduction 
Development and implementation of smart grid technologies offers substantial advantages over traditional 
vertically integrated electric utilities. Both parties stand to benefit from proliferation of these technologies. The end-
users of electrical power primarily wish to minimize the cost they pay to the utility for the energy they require to 
power their devices. Opposed to this, the utility company wishes to maximize its net profit and is concerned with load 
scheduling as they must remain able to provide adequate supply. In this paper, a market framework has been developed 
based on game-theoretical concepts where Demand Response Aggregators (DRAs) compete with each other to sell 
energy stored in consumer’s battery systems. Our model determines the optimal bidding decision for each DRA to 
maximize its own pay off under the conditions of an incomplete information game.  
Game theory has been used in power system markets to interpret a participant’s behavior in deregulated 
environments and to allocate costs among pool participants. Two different hybrid algorithms were presented [1, 2, 3] 
for the Generation Expansion Planning (GEP) problem for a pool-based electric market where the modified-game-
theoretic algorithms were divided into two programing levels: master and slave. A static computational game theoretic 
model has also been developed [4] to investigate the impacts of competition on the wholesale price of electricity, the 
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demand for electricity, the profits of firms, and levels of various polluting emissions. A Medium Run Electricity 
Market Simulator (MREMS) based on game theory was presented in [5]. This simulator incorporated two different 
games, one for the unit commitment of thermal units and one for strategic bidding and hourly market clearing. The 
most common electricity bidding mechanisms in electricity auction markets were analyzed using signaling game 
theory [6] and also a Swarm platform was used to develop a simulation model based for multiple agents. The role of 
sustainable energy volatility was investigated in the context of market participant’s competitive expansion planning 
problem in [7]. An incomplete information non-cooperative game-theoretic method where each generation company 
(GENCO) perceives strategies of other market participants was applied to make decisions about strategic generation 
capacity expansion. An agent-based game-theoretic formulation was presented in [8] to investigate the learning speed 
of traders and their strategic collaboration in dynamic electricity markets. It was shown that the learning speed of 
traders decreases during large fluctuations in the power exchange market.  
The Authors of [9] expanded the application of an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) 
model, typically used with multi-leader-follower games, to a spatial market. In that model, the prevalent market setting 
was investigated in the international market for metallurgical coal between 2008 and 2010, whose market 
characteristics provide arguments for a wide variety of alternate market structures. A two-sided agent-based 
framework was proposed in [10] employing a game-theoretic/Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) hybrid simulation 
approach to provide a suitable platform for sustainable GEP. A Bayesian game model analyzing cross-border transfer 
of electric power was presented in [11] to explain cross-border transfer within a market containing players controlling 
unreliable marginal generators. A dynamic game-theoretic model was developed in [12] to analyze the impacts of 
natural gas market reformation in promoting  Natural Gas-Fired Electricity (NGFE) generation, in which hourly Real-
Time Pricing (RTP) was applied in both natural gas and electricity markets [53]. An innovative game theoretic 
framework was proposed in [13] for a next-generation retail electricity market (“Energy Internet’’) with high 
penetration of distributed residential electricity suppliers (‘‘Energy Cells’’). The envisioned Energy Internet proposes 
a large number of distributed Renewable energy generation and energy storage systems connected to the grid through 
plug-and-play interfacing devices. A game-theoretic framework for economic operations of future residential 
distribution systems was presented in [14] for cases involving extensive participation of distributed electricity 
prosumers which defined novel roles for both the utilities and “customers”. The game theoretic algorithms used to 
determine the retail electricity market clearing price consider group coalition scenarios of multiple electricity 
prosumers. 
Game theory is a useful mathematical tool to handle problems related to demand side management (DSM) [15, 
48-51]. Several game-theoretical demand response (DR) programs have been proposed with differing objectives such 
as: determining the optimal hourly incentive to be offered to customers who sign up for load curtailment [16, 17, 52], 
scheduling load usage by creating several possible tariffs for consumers such that net demand remains below some 
threshold [18], adjusting demand to meet supply, as well as smoothing the aggregated load in the system [19], and 
evaluating the impact of the response capability of smart-home consumers on promoting further distributed PV 
penetration [20]. Game theory was used in [21] to present an optimization model to minimize load curtailment needed 
to restore equilibrium to the operating point when the system is in a fault condition (e.g., loss of generation). An 
optimal time-of-use pricing with an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective was proposed in [22] for urban gas 
markets where a power structure demand response program was employed to simulate user demand response. 
Decision-making (DM) processes are the principle product of game theory. Basically, Game theory is the formal 
study of DM under competitive conditions where choices potentially affect the interests of the other players. In [23] a 
DM approach for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects was presented. The approach was based on a consensus 
algorithm addressing the consensus output over a common value using cost functions within a framework based on 
game theory. In another work [24], a DM process for conceptual planning and project evaluation in the oil and gas 
industry was presented where the set of strategic decisions is generated by a binary genetic algorithm. In [25] , DM 
processes of industrial and environmental concerns was evaluated with a game theoretic approach where Industry and 
Environment were considered as two players with conflicting interest to find optimal strategies in governing energy 
policy. A bi-level, complete-information, matrix game-theoretic model was proposed in [26] to assess the economic 
impact and make operational decisions in carbon- constrained restructured electricity markets. A game theoretic 
modeling approach was performed in [27] to develop financial transmission rights bidding strategies for power 
suppliers assuming that they have adequately forecast Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). The game theoretic model 
considered multiple participants as well as network contingencies. An evolutionary imperfect-information game 
approach was proposed in [28] to analyze bidding strategies in electricity markets with price-elastic demand. The 
research work presented in [29] characterized the impact of Long-term plans on short-term maintenance decisions of 
GENCOs by applying the Cournot model, which has been used for strategic generation dispatch of generating units 
in electricity markets. 
In order to characterize the DM process, Nash equilibrium is used. A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no 
player can do better by unilaterally changing his or her strategy [30].  The authors of [31] suggested to use a theory of 
evolutionary games and the concept of a “near Nash equilibrium” to simulate the electricity market in the presence of 
more than two producers. In [32], a novel game-theoretic approach was presented to the Generation Maintenance 
Scheduling (GMS) problem in electricity markets where a coordination procedure for an Independent Service Operator 
(ISO) was modeled and the GENCOs GMS process was modeled as a non-cooperative dynamic game, and the 
GENCO’s optimal strategy profile was determined by the Nash equilibrium of the game. In [33], the conventional 
model of a dynamic Cournot electricity market game (where GENCOs are assumed to hold a uniform and accurate 
belief concerning market dynamics) was replaced by a more realistic model with subjective demand errors coining a 
new equilibrium concept termed Subjective Equilibrium (SE). System performance, equilibrium output, profit and 
customer surplus, at SE were analyzed. The results of [33] suggested that the system equilibriums are strongly 
influenced by the GENCOs’ knowledge about market demand. 
In game theory, different types of games are utilized for analysis of different types of problems. The different 
types of games are categorized by number of players involved, symmetry of the game, and whether or not, cooperation 
among players is allowed. In the literature for power markets, the different game models used include: cooperative 
[34, 35, 36, 37], non-cooperative [20, 38], Stackelberg [9, 39], multi-leader-follower [9], Forchheimer (one leader) 
[5], and Bertrand games (all players are leaders) [5]. Beside the application in power markets, game theory has been 
used in diverse, and related fields such as: analysis of Electric Vehicle (EV) charging station construction [40], 
charging method for plugged in hybrid EVs [41], analysis of power grid vulnerability [42], performance evaluation of 
thermal power plants [43], analysis of effects of higher domestic gas prices in Russia on the European gas market 
[44], and interactive energy management of networked microgrid-based active distribution systems [45]. 
In the present work, a demand response market framework has been developed based on game-theoretic 
considerations. In this market, the commodity is energy stored in consumers’ batteries. End users of electricity charge 
their batteries when the electricity is cheap and sell it back to the grid (or other consumers) when the electricity is 
more expensive. There are four basic concepts in game theory including: players, nodes, moves, and payoffs. In the 
proposed market framework, the players are DRAs and each node belongs to one DRA. The possible moves of the 
game are the player's decision–i.e.: any of the options chosen by a given DRA. A player's strategy will determine the 
action the player will take at each stage of the game. In the proposed market structure, strategies are different biddings 
of DRAs. The payoff to each player (DRA) is the difference between monetary gain upon selling its stored energy and 
the cost of storing that energy. A comprehensive quadratic cost function has been proposed in this study for 
discharging the energy stored in batteries. Also, it has been assumed that players are privy to no information about 
other player’s moves. Therefore, our problem is cast as a real, incomplete information game (i-game). Two different 
types of game are considered here: non-cooperative, and Stackelberg. In the non-cooperative game, DRAs compete 
to sell the energies stored in the batteries without any limitation or constraints in transaction size or price; but in the 
Stackelberg game, the utility (as game leader) controls the DR market through restricting both. In each game, two 
different DR programs are considered: non-scheduled demand and price-sensitive scheduling of water heaters (or all 
thermostatic devices). Dynamic Programing (DP) has been used for price-sensitive scheduling. 
Section 2 explains some principles of game theory’s application to energy markets. In section 3, a cost function 
and a payoff function have been developed in order to utilize in the proposed method. Section 4 describes the proposed 
game-theoretic market framework including the alternate game types and DR schedules considered. The presented 
market framework has been applied to a case study and its dissection and results have been provided in section 5. 
Finally, conclusions and possible future works are presented in section 6. 
 
 
 
 
2. Principles and definitions of game theory in power market 
First, let us briefly present the fundamental principles and definitions of the game-theoretic concepts we need to 
analyze a power market. The following subsections cover: a proposed function we will use to model the aggregator’s 
cost, the bidding process of DRAs, and the payoff function for DRAs.  
2.1.  Game theory in power market 
In game theory, beliefs are formulated against risky alternatives in order to maximize the expected revenue 
(payoff function) for aggregators. In the real competition, each player (DRA) remains unaware of the detailed data of 
other players (for instance data of strategies and payoffs). Probability theory gives an expected value of the payoff 
given the probability of events and Bay’s law is used to revise beliefs given new information. The objective of the 
game-theoretic analysis is to find the Nash equilibrium – the best strategy from the set of possibilities in the sense that 
no incentive exist to alter the equilibrium strategy despite the strategies chosen by the other players. Fig. 1 illustrates 
a power market where some of the aggregators acting as buyers and others acting as sellers submit their bids to a 
center (ISO) and this center sets a market spot price between aggregators. 
 
 
Fig. 1: General structure of a power market including buyer DRAs, seller DRAs, and ISO 
DRAs participate in the market to sell their available stored energy which is not consumed in powering local loads. In 
a power transaction game, aggregators’ transactions are modeled as a game of strategies to maximize their payoffs. 
Two types of games are considered in this research: non-cooperative and Stackelberg. A non-cooperative game takes 
place when each player (DRA) is interested to maximize its own payoff and there is no cooperation between 
aggregators to coordinate their strategies. In a non-cooperative game, some aggregators choose a strategy while other 
aggregators try to identify their best response to that strategy. In a Stackelberg game, there is one leader (utility) to 
limit the market price and power transferred to ensure all policies are respected in the market. 
2.2.  Aggregator cost function 
This subsection shows how DRA’s cost function can be presented with a quadratic function. Since the only energy 
resources available for sale by a given DRA is the the aggregation of stored energy in residential batteries, the 
aggregator cost function is the battery cost function (cost of discharging the battery). For the battery, the function we 
chose is a variant of the widely used logarithmic barrier function, used as a penalty function in interior point methods 
[46]: 
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where bathiC is cost of the battery in house i as a function of stored energy, iha is a pricing coefficient determined by 
the utility to give higher prices during peak-hours, 
ih
E is the total load (kWh), and B is a parameter that has been 
used to give cost values very close to the values given by a quadratic one, it also serves as the maximum typical value 
for
ih
E . The relation between the presented cost function (Eq. 1) and the quadratic one can be understood from its 
Taylor expansion. Since 1 BE
ih , the Taylor series expansion is: 
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(2) 
Updates in load data resolve every 15 minutes from measurement devices. We assume that the load is constant for 
each 15 minutes between updates and the quadratic cost function of the battery can be rewritten as a function of power 
(
ih
P ):  
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In order to obtain the coefficients 
ih
a and B, two factors should be considered: the electricity price of the grid (for 
charging the battery) and the capital and maintenance costs of the battery. Thus, the cost of the battery of house i for 
charging the power by an amount 
ih
P is: 
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where  
ii h
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h PC   is the cost which house i pays to the utility to sell its electricity and to charge its own battery as 
amount power of 
ih
P and  
ii h
MC
h PC &  is the contribution of capital and maintenance costs of the battery of house 
i for power of 
ih
P . The coefficients 
ih
a and B can be obtained using Eq. 4. Since the individual house cost functions 
are quadratic in form, aggregation of the houses will also produce quadratic cost functions for each DRA: 
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where gC  is the cost function of aggregator g for selling the stored power of gP (in kW), and the coefficients of gu
and gv  are: 
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, and hN  is the number of houses under aggregator g.  
2.3.  Bidding process of DRAs 
This section explains how DRAs bid their price for selling the stored energy in batteries, based on the cost function 
defined in section 2.2. From Eq. 5, the marginal cost of aggregator i is: 
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Since marginal cost is a linear function of stored power in batteries, we assume that aggregators’ bids are also linear 
functions of stored power: 
iiii Pm 0  (9) 
where i Is the bid price per unit of power at discharging power level iP , i0 is the marginal cost of electricity at iP0
, and im is the slope of the bid curve. The market coordinator (ISO) receives sale bids from the DRAs given by  Eq. 
9 and matches the lowest bid with the buyer aggregators. In Fig. 2, the aggregator intends to increase the battery 
discharging beyond iP0 if the spot market price is greater than i0 .Here, iT  is the net power interchanged; if iT is 
positive (negative), the aggregator is selling power to (buying power from) the other aggregators, 
iiii PPTP 0max,0  . The maximum stored power in the aggregated storages of DRA i is iPmax, , the minimum 
of the local load of DRA i which should be fed by local batteries is iP0  (can be established as one of the governing 
policies of aggregator i).  
  
 
Fig. 2: Aggregator g’s biding curve 
 
2.4.  Aggregator’s payoff function 
The mathematical formulation for each DRA’s payoff function in the proposed game-theoretic framework is 
described below. For a given spot market price,  , the ith DRAs payoff, iR , is: 
 
iii TCR   (10) 
where iC  is the difference between the discharging cost of the batteries in aggregator before and after power 
transactions, and iT  is the net power transacted.  
 Let T denote a power transaction; associated with each T is a pair of aggregator payoffs ),(  for participants 
1 and 2. The Nash bargaining problem for two aggregators is denoted by )],(,[  characterized by a region,  , 
and a payoff point ),(  in  . Without any trading, the payoff is )0,0( ; a trade would take place if and only if 
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both aggregators agree upon a solution in   which represents an acceptable deal for the participants involved. The 
problem is formulated as follows: given )0,0(),( 00   in  as the initial solution, find a different solution, 
),( 11  , that satisfies the conditions: 
 ),( 11  is a point of  . 
 0011          ),( 00   &  0,0 11    
The point ),( 11   is the Nash equilibrium solution to the bargaining game )],(,[  .  
 
       From the definition of the payoff function for DRA g in eq. 10, the objective function is: 
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k
ijR is the payoff of DRA i (as a seller) after transmitting the power of ijT to aggregator j (and receiving the power of 
*
ijT by aggregator j) in contract k. The difference between ijT and *ijT is due to transmission losses. With negligible 
transmission losses *ijij TT  . The parameter, ij , is the transaction price and giP is the amount of the local loads of 
the aggregator i which is fed by the local storages before power transaction. The first term in eq. 11 is the gross revenue 
of the aggregator due to the transaction and the second bracketed term is the change in the aggregator’s batteries 
discharging cost owing to the transaction. In the case of two aggregators shown in Fig.3 (aggregator 1 as seller and 2 
as buyer), the objective function is: 
maximize }{ buyerseller RR  , 
where 
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and T is the tranction price and sellerR and buyerR  are the aggregators payoffs. Each aggregator has a constrained 
storage capacity, and payoffs are constrained by 0sellerR , and 0buyerR , indicating that negative payoffs are 
excluded. When there are no transactions, the payoff for each aggregator is zero. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: A system including two DRAs as seller and buyer 
 
In real competition between aggregators, participants don’t have information about the other participants 
such as cost function coefficients, availability of the batteries, and biding prices. The following section shows the 
proposed game-theoretic market framework for competition between DRAs to sell energy stored in batteries in an 
incomplete information game.  
 
 
 
 
3. Proposed game-theoretic market framework for DRAs  
 
The proposed methodology is  explained in this section. The first subsection includes details about the incomplete 
information game to make a market competition among DRAs. The proposed market framework based on game theory 
has been presented in the second subsection. All mathematical and probabilistic details for the developed market 
framework (including two different game types each with and two demand scheduling programs) have been provided 
in second subsection.  
Fig. 4 shows a visual schematic of the proposed market framework. Each DRA manages a number of buildings 
with control signals sent through a wireless network. Each house contains various devices possibly including Water 
Heaters (WHs), Batteries, Air Conditioners (ACs), and Electric Vehicles (EVs). The DRAs decide how to bid for 
buying and selling power in the market. A DP scheduler outputs signals for deciding when a WH should run-on/off 
setting as a function of time-to satisfy the conditions in the game (social welfare in all games, and price-sensitive DR 
WH scheduling in the games where it is implemented) given as inputs hot water usage data (in all games) and possibly 
electricity price signals from the utility (only for the games with price-sensitive DR WH scheduling). The DRAs 
communicate through a wireless network with servers which communicate with the market directly to arrange 
transactions. In the Stackelberg games, the servers also mitigate size and price of transactions in accordance with 
utility policy constraints which are transmitted over the wireless network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: General schematic of the proposed market framework in two types of games and two DR scheduling program 
3.1.  Market competition between DRAs with incomplete information 
 
In this section, a market model is proposed to model competition among aggregators in an electricity market 
where participants have incomplete information. Based on eq. 10, each aggregator’s payoff is a function of storages 
discharging costs, power transactions, and the spot market price. Hence, an individual aggregator’s payoff is a function 
of bids offered by other aggregators. Each participant estimates the other participants’ bids in order to maximize its 
own payoff. Each aggregator has complete information concerning its own payoff but lacks information critical to 
predicting others actions precisely, this competition is known as an incomplete game (i-game). Here, an aggregator’s 
unknown characteristics are modeled by classification of participant’s types. The DRA’s type contains information 
concerning: its own payoff function, other aggregators’ pay off functions, grid electricity prices, availability of charged 
batteries, etc.. An aggregator’s type corresponds to its battery discharging cost structure, that is, coefficients ia and 
B  (Eq. 5 and 6). Each aggregator would have full knowledge of its own costs, but only an estimate of the remaining 
aggregator’ costs. Each participant adjusts the slope of m in its bidding curve (Fig. 2) in order to maximize its payoff,
iR , in Eq. 10. The choice of m corresponds with the bidding strategy (bid low, bid high, bid marginal cost) in the 
game. The main goal of the game is to determine the optimal DM process used to determine what value of m to choose 
in order to maximize payoff despite the unknown parameters of the other participants.  
 
The DRAs use a Bayesian approach to deal with incomplete information. In this approach, a probability 
distribution, , represents the unknown parameters. The expected value of the payoffs of the aggregators are 
maximized for . In estimating the probability distribution, each aggregator uses only the information common to 
all aggregators.  
 
Consider a scenario described from DRA B’s perspective for competing with DRA A for selling the stored energy 
of the batteries to aggregator C depicted in Fig. 5, below. We assume that the participants’ types are drawn at random 
from hypothetical populations A and B  containing types mAt and nBt , respectively where Mm ,...,1  and 
Nn ,...,1  index the possible types of DRA A and B, respectively. For instance, to model the uncertainty in A’s 
discharging cost, B would assume that there are M possible types of A, mAt , each with its corresponding cost. 
Generally, aggregator B knows n but does not know m, and hence does not know its opponent’s type (i.e. it does not 
know A’s discharging costs). Each DRA estimates the probability distributions ,  , for the random variable of  the 
“type” of its competitors based on freely available published information such as electricity prices, demand curves, 
water usage (from water heaters), availability of storages, and aggregators’ parameters.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5: A grid including three DRAs: A and B as sellers and C as buyer 
 
3.2.  Game-theoretic market framework 
For our purposes, the goal of the game is to calculate the expected payoffs for different strategies for aggregators 
A and B (in the mentioned scenario) to find the Nash equilibrium and to choose the strategy that maximizes payoff: 
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where mAEP is the expected payoff function of aggregator A if it is of type Mm . n is the type of opponent 
aggregator B ( Nn ). The conditional probability )(nmA is the probability DRA A is of type m for DRA B of type 
n: 
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where prob  shows the conditional probability function, and mn is the basic probability distribution
corresponds to the probability that A is type m and B is type n. A DRA’s strategy (for bidding) is determined by its 
type. mAs  is a vector of strategies for A’s type m. For example, a vector of strategies may be: bid high, bid at marginal 
cost, and bid low. mAH  is the conditional payoff of DRA A which depends on the strategies of DRA A, 
m
As , and DRA 
B, nBs . Aggregator A needs to know the opponent’s type to maximize
m
AH , and since the information is not available 
in an i-game, aggregator A maximizes the expected value of the payoff mAEP .  
  
Similarly, for aggregator B, the expected payoff function is: 
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3.2.1. Non-cooperative game 
The i-game considered previous converts to a (M + N)-participant game as an imperfect information complete 
game (c-game), where M and N are the number of different types of aggregators A and B, respectively, in the case that 
each aggregator knows the others’ payoff functions and, basic probability distributions involved in the game but does 
not know the opponent’s type.  The Nash equilibrium is the solution. We consider two variants of (c-game): non-
cooperative and Stackelberg, in a scenario involving three DRAs competing to sell energy stored in their batteries. In 
each game, the effect of price-sensitive demand response scheduling (for WHs and other similar thermostatic storages) 
has been considered and the market model has been proposed with/without DR scheduling. The algorithm shown (Fig. 
6) depicts the procedure used to calculate the requisite parameters used in obtaining the Nash equilibrium.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6: steps of calculating required parameters in the game-theoretic market 
 
The following subsections explain how to determine the parameters needed in the DM process for each game and 
each demand response scheduling program. 
 
3.2.1.1.  Non-cooperative game without DR scheduling 
 Assuming that DRAs A, and B, know C’s payoff function, we may determine the nash equilibrium following 
the procedure outlined in Fig. 6.  
 
Step1: Define aggregators’ types: 
In the first step, a set of different possible discharging cost function’s coefficients ( ia and B in Eq. 5 to 7) is defined 
for each aggregator A and B. The number of defined types are M and N for aggregators A and B, respectively. The 
participant’s type is determined largely by electricity price and availability of the batteries for discharging. The 
electricity price is significant because the batteries are charged directly from the grid. Availability of stored energy in 
the batteries may be estimated by considering use patterns for high power consumption devices such as Water Heaters 
(WHs) and other thermostatic devices. For example, when the WHs are consuming power (based on the water usage 
and water temperature data), most of the energy stored in the batteries is being consumed locally to power these 
devices. Considering these two factors we may classify an aggregator into one of four scenarios: 
1 : },{ exp offWHelec  
2 : },{ exp onWHelec  
3 : },{ offch WHelec  
4 : },{ onch WHelec  
For a non-cooperative game without price-sensitive demand response, scheduling depends entirely on water usage 
and is completely independent of the price of electricity since the thermostat functions only to maintain the social 
welfare demands of the customer without considering price. When two events are independent, the probability of both 
events occurring is the product of the probabilities of each event. For aggregator scenarios 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , we have: 
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fP  , and P () is the probability of event . The probability of the WHs’ power state ( )( offWHP and 
)( onWHP ) are obtained from the DP scheduler block described in Fig. 4. In this case, the scheduler is determined 
by typical water consumption profile and the only objective function is to maintain social welfare- i.e. that the WH 
maintains temperatures in the range require by the customer to ensure sufficient hot water is available. 
Let fA and fB be probability distributions modeling uncertainties in each aggregator’s discharging cost: 
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)(mfA is the probability that aggregator A is of type m ( Mm ) in scenario f and )(nfB  is the probability that 
aggregator B is in type n ( Nn ). 
 
 Step2: Define the basic probability distribution of the game: 
The probability that (m, n) would represent participants A and B’s types, respectively, would depend on 
electricity price and local demand (WHs’ conditions). The expected probability that A is type m and B is type n, mn
, is defined as:  
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(20) 
Where )( f is a participation coefficient for scenario f: equal to one for participants selling energy in the market 
and 0 otherwise. For example, 0)( 2   because when the electricity is expensive and the water usage is high, 
energy stored in electrochemical cells will be used preferably for powering local loads. 
1)()()( 431    because if the price of electricity is cheap, the stored energy is available for sale as 
loads may be supplied directly from the grid at lower cost; whereas even if the price is high, absence of local demand 
leaves energy available for sale. Given this scheme for predicting mn , the original i-game may be treated as a c-game 
with imperfect information. Each aggregator now knows its cost function’s coefficients and may compute its own 
discharging costs without knowing the opponent’s discharging cost. In this step )(nmA and )(mnB are calculated
),( MmNn  . 
 
Step 3: Define aggregators’ strategies 
An aggregator’s type corresponds to a set of strategies defined by bid slopes (Fig. 2). We assume that each 
aggregator has three strategies based on Eq. 9. The slope of the bid curve of gth    aggregator (Fig. 2) is gSg um  
where S is set to ],,[ 321 SSS   for three different strategies. These strategies are: 21 S for bidding less than 
marginal cost, 22 S for biding at marginal cost, and 23 S  for bidding more than marginal cost. Coefficient 
gu was defined in Eq. 5. In this step
m
As and 
n
Bs are calculated ),( MmNn  .  
 
Step 4: Define aggregators’ conditional payoff 
In this step the following system of equations has been solved for a combination of participant types and 
strategies: 
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(21) 
where AP and BP are the power remaining in the storages cells of DRA A and B, after feeding their local loads. This 
power is sold to aggregator C ( CL is the power purchased by aggregator C), and T  is the transaction price. After 
determining AP , BP , and T , in eq. 21, the conditional payoffs of DRA A and B may be calculated with eq. 12 and 
13. The conditional payoff matrixes take the form: 
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In )(nH mA , each row corresponds to a strategy of A for type m and each column corresponds to a strategy of B for 
type n. For instance, 23,Ah in )1(
2
AH corresponds to A’s type 2 payoff if A decides to bid marginal cost against a 
situation where B is type 1 and bids above marginal. )(mH nB  is defined similarly.    
 
Step 5: Define expected payoff matrices. 
Expected values of the payoffs, mAEP  and
n
BEP , are calculated using eq. 14, 15, 16, 22 and 23. The final 
form of the mAEP matrix is: 
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Each column of mAEP corresponds to the presumed strategy of participant A’s opponent. For instance, 32  column 
in 1AEP  is A’s type 1 payoff when B uses strategy 3 against A’s type 1 and strategy 2 against A’s type 2. The same 
notation applies to nBEP . 
 
Step 6: Obtain the Nash equilibrium of strategies 
Utilizing mAEP and 
n
BEP ,the Nash equilibrium pairs are obtained. We look for the collection of strategies 
in which each aggregator’s strategy would be represented by the best response to other aggregator’s strategies. The 
Nash equilibrium is a prediction of how the game will be played. An aggregator’s optimal bid is derived for this 
equilibrium point. All aggregators predict that a particular Nash equilibrium will occur and there is no incentive to 
play differently. 
 
3.2.1.2.  Non-cooperative game with DR scheduling 
In this game, price-sensitive scheduling of water heaters is considered. The steps of this game are the same as 
non-cooperative game without DR scheduling (section 3.2.1.1) with a single exception in the first step. For a non-
cooperative game without DR scheduling, WHs keep the water temperature in a given range to satisfy social welfare 
constraints , and situation of WHs (On/Off) is independent of the electricity price. In non-cooperative game with DR 
scheduling, the objectives are both social welfare and demand scheduling. The first step in finding the Nash 
equilibrium of the non-cooperative game with DR scheduling requires knowledge of conditional probabilities since 
the events are not independent. 
 
Step1: Define aggregators’ types 
As in section 3.2.1.1, a set of possible discharging cost function’s coefficients ( ia and B in eq. 6 and 7) is 
defined for each DRA acting as a seller (A and B). Similarly we define four scenarios ( 41,..., ) depending on the 
same variables two variables (electricity price and WHs’ condition), but in this game these events are dependent due 
to price-sensitive DR scheduling. When two events are dependent, the probability of both occurring is defined using 
conditional probability: 
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The second part of each equation is the conditional probability. For instance )/( expelecWHP off is the probability 
that the water heater is off given that electricity is expensive. These conditional probabilities are calculated using the 
DP scheduler (mentioned in Fig. 4) considering two objective functions: social welfare and DR scheduling. In this 
game more batteries are available to provide power because scheduling has disabled some loads, thus each DRA 
stands to make a larger payoff then in the game without DR scheduling (3.2.1.1).  
3.2.1.3.  Stackelberg game without DR scheduling 
In the previous sections while considering non-cooperative games, we assumed that the transaction price (and 
transaction power) depend only on the DRAs bid prices (eq. 21). DRAs with storage capabilities will tend to charge 
their batteries when energy is less expensive during off-peak hours, in order to sell it to other DRAs during peak hours 
when the price is high thereby maximizing their gains per transaction. When enough DRAs do this, a phenomenon 
termed “Reverse Peaks” becomes apparent where the shift of peak consumption is accompanied by a high tendency 
of aggregators to sell their stored energy back during high price hours. This undesirable effect can be resolved by 
allowing a market controlling center (i.e., utility or any other center controlled by the utility) to a play the role of 
market controller in the game. The leader is allowed to set bounds on market transaction quantity, and price thereby 
ameliorating the undesirable effects on the market associated with reverse peaks. Competition including a market 
controller can be modeled as a Stackelberg game. A Nash equilibrium exist for the Stackelberg game-i.e. each rational 
player will chose a particular predictable strategy which offers them no incentive to alter it despite the strategies 
chosen by the competitors.    
Finding the Nash equilibrium for the Stackelberg game follows the procedure outlined in fig. 6, similar to 
the previous sections with the exception that in calculating the conditional payoff (step 4), the transaction powers (
BA PP , ) and transaction price ( T ) are controlled by the leader (utility). If these values, ( maxmaxmax ,, TBA PP  ), fall 
within the range permitted by the controller, the transactions proceeds; but if the obtained values from eq. 21 are 
higher than maximum allowable values, these maximum values are used to clear the market. Applying the utility’s 
policies in Stackelberg game, prevents the huge effects of players (aggregators) in the market and also prevents reverse 
peaks. 
 
3.2.1.4.  Stackleberg game with DR scheduling: 
 The analysis of the Stakleberg game with DR scheduling follows reasoning similar to one without DR 
scheduling (section 3.2.1.3) with the exception that we must assume that electricity price and water usage are 
dependent events. Conditional probabilities are used in calculating the the probabilities of the intersection of dependent 
events for the possible aggregator scenarios in step 1 analogous to what was done in section 3.2.1.2 when considering 
DR scheduling for a non-cooperative game. 
 
4. Case study, Discussion and results 
For illustration purposes, consider a system with three DRAs labeled A, B, and C as depicted in fig. 7. Load data 
for these three DRAs was taken from a real grid model on the island of Maui (Hawaii-United States) [47].  
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Case study including 3 agregators: A and B as sellers and C as buyer 
 
DRA A manages 200 houses, all of which contain electrochemical storage cells. DRA B manages 240 house, but only 
180 have storage devices. DRA C manages 240 houses of which only 180 are equipped with storage devices. All 
houses have WHs assumed to draw the majority of the load (60%). The nominal power of each residential storage 
device is 3.3 kW. Thus, the maximum generation capacity of any DRA is: 
kW 528=P 594kW, =P 660kW, =P genC
gen
B
gen
A  
In this case study we assume that the nominal power of each WH is 4.5 kW. Thus, the total power demand of A is: 
kW2160P10/6*4.5*200 =P genA
demand
A   
Similarly, for other aggregators: 
kWkW 2478=P,2394=P demandC
demand
B  
Since the marginal cost of DRA C is greater than for other aggregators, A and B will compete to sell power to C. We 
assume that M = 2 and N = 2 and that the DRAs discharge cost coefficients are:
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For simplicity, it is assumed that both sellers, A and B, know the discharging cost coefficient of the buyer, C.  
 
Fig. 8 shows the normalized price of electricity (in Maui Island) as a function of time over the course of a single day, 
price updates resolve every fifteen minutes. The normalized average water consumption for the houses of aggregators 
A and B is shown in Fig. 9 for the same time intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Normalized electricity price in one day of case study (resolution: 15minutes) 
 
Fig. 9: Normalized average water consumption for houses of seller aggregators of case study (resolution: 15minutes) 
  
Results for non-cooperative and Stackelberg games, with and without DR scheduling are presented in the following 
sections. 
 
4.1.  Results of non-cooperative game without DR scheduling  
For our purposes, we take prices over half of the normalized price of electricity to be “expensive”. From the 
normalized price data (Fig. 8), 2917.0)(,7083.0)( exp  chelecPelecP . The status of the WHs (on/off) may be 
determined from the water consumption data (Fig. 9). In order to keep water temperatures in the range of 110 to 
F130 , a typical WH runs (consumes power) for 18 of the 96 fifteen minute intervals of the day. Fig. 10 is the output 
of DP scheduler and shows the status of the seller’s WHs in this game (non-cooperative without DR scheduling). 
 
 
 
Fig. 10: On/Off status of WHs in non-cooperative game without DR scheduling for the seller aggregators 
 
 
 The probabilities 1875.0)( onWHP  and 0.8125)( offWHP  follow immediately from the known ratio of on 
to off intervals. Using the equations from section 3.2.1.1, the probabilities of the four scenarios are: 
0.0547)(,0.2370)(0.1328,)( 0.5755,)( 4321   PPPP . 
Probability distributions for both DRAs A and B in the above mentioned scenarios are: 
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].0.40 , 0.60[],0.31 , 0.69[,0.33] , 0.67[],0.25 , 0.75[
],0.82 , 0.18[],0.89 , 0.11[,0.79] , 0.21[],0.84 , 0.16[
4433
2211
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 The expected probabilities (eq. 20) are: 
0.3819. , 0.1015 , 0.0727  , 0.0193 22211211    
Conditional probability vectors for DRAs A and B are calculated using eq. 15 and 17: 
]84.0,16.0[ ,]0.79 , [0.21],84.0,16.0[ ,]0.79 , [0.21 2211  BABA  . 
 We assume that each DRA choses one of the following strategies: biding 80% of marginal cost )6.1( 1 S , biding 
marginal cost )2( 2 S , and biding 120% of marginal cost )4.2( 3 S . Therefore, the strategies are:  
]0.00096 , 0.00080 , 0.00064[1 As  
],0.00117 0.00097 , 0.00078[2 As  
]0.00109 , 0.00091 , 0.00073[1 Bs  
]0.00122 , 0.00102 , 0.00081[2 Bs  
Finally, from the equations in step 5 of section 3.2.1.1, the expected pay off matrixes are: 
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The DRAs chose their bidding strategies by finding the Nash equilibrium. By inspecting the expected pay off matrices 
we find that for DRA A, 1AEP  and
2
AEP , we see that the bottom row of each matrix, )3(
1
As  and )3(
2
As - i.e. bid above 
marginal cost if A is of type 1 or type 2- results in the greatest expected payoff regardless of competitors strategies; 
we say that this strategy dominates the the others. DRA B will also conclude that a rational player A will choose 
strategy 3 (bid above marginal cost) regardless of its type. DRA B need only consider the best response to this strategy. 
This is done by considering the 9th column of 1BEP  and
2
BEP . Which represents the payoffs of for B’s possible 
strategies when competing against a player A who bids above marginal cost.  Examining the last column of 1BEP  and
2
BEP  tells us that: if B is type 1, it will receive the greatest payoff by bidding above marginal cost; and if B is type 2 
it will receive the greatest payoff by bidding below marginal cost. Player A knows that B will play this way, but has 
no incentive to change its strategy.  This strategy is represented by column 7th of 1AEP  and
2
AEP  (column 31 of 
AEP  in step 5 of section 3.2.1.1). The pair of strategies “9th column of BEP ” and “7th column of AEP ” is the Nash 
equilibrium of the game. The Nash equilibrium is a “consistent” prediction of how the game will be played by rational 
players. All participants predict that a particular Nash equilibrium will occur and there is no incentive to play 
differently. The strategy pairs in Nash equilibrium are the participants’ maximum strategies which maximize 
participants’ conditional payoffs. That is, a participant could obtain at least the payoff at the equilibrium point (or it 
may obtain more depending on his opponent’s strategy). 
In this section, scheduling of WHs are based on only one objective function: social welfare. The situation of each WH 
is based on water consumption only (Fig. 9) and is not effected by the electricity price (Fig. 8).   
 
4.2.  Results of non-cooperative game with price-sensitive WH scheduling 
In this case, DP scheduler has been used to schedule the WHs of aggregator A, based on the electricity price 
(Fig.8) with the joint objectives of social welfare (keeping water temperature in a given range F]130,110[  using 
Fig. 9) and DR scheduling using DP. Similar to section 4.1, . Fig. 11 
depicts scheduling of the WHs of aggregator A using DP (with inputs of data shown in Fig. 8 and 9). The highlighted 
areas show the times when the electricity is expensive (prices higher than half of maximum price).  
  
 
 
Fig. 11: On/Off status of WHs in non-cooperative game with DR scheduling for the aggregator A 
 
In this case, based on the Fig. 11 and equations of section 3.2.1.2: 
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In aggregator A, Comparison of Fig. 10 with Fig. 11 shows DR scheduling can curtail the load of WHs as much as 
11.2%. Therefore the new demand of the aggregator A is: 
. It is assumed here that aggregators B and C do not schedule their WHs. Therefore, the demands of these aggregators 
are the same as in section 4.1: . Because of the load curtailment, 
aggregator A has more power stored in its batteries to sell to the aggregator C. With the same probability distributions 
and same strategies as in section 4.1 and following the same game process, the expected payoff matrices are: 
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74.29       44.41        5.45         69           39.12        0.16         62.11        32.23        6.73-        
96.09       67.25      29.29        91.03        62.2       24.23        84.37        55.54        17.57        
119.42     92.53       56.62      114.77     87.88       51.96      108.55       81.66        45.74        
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Following the same reasoning used in section 4.1 for finding the Nash equilibrium, aggregator A obtains a higher 
payoff by bidding above its marginal cost. By inspecting the last column of 1BEP  and
2
BEP , we learn that a rational 
participant B would bid )3(1Bs  (above its marginal cost) when it is type 1 and )1(
2
Bs  (below marginal cost) when it 
is type 2. This strategy is represented by column 7th of 1AEP  and
2
AEP . The pair of strategies “9th column of BEP ” 
and “7th column of AEP ” is the Nash equilibrium of the game. The Nash equilibrium strategies are for A to bid higher 
than marginal cost regardless of its type and for B to bid above, or below marginal cost depending if it is type 1 or 
type 2, respectively.  
 
 
4.3.  Stackelberg game without DR scheduling  
In non-cooperative game, there was no limitation power transactions or transaction prices for selling the stored 
energy between the aggregators. The transaction price and transaction power are obtained from Eq. 21, but in real 
markets there will exist a controller who limits the transaction power and transaction price. This independent controller 
is empowered by the utility and communicates with the utility to control the market. In this case study, for the non-
cooperative games (section 4.1 and 4.2) the transaction prices (eq. 21) varied between $0.3342 and $0.4903. It is 
assumed now that the controller limits the selling price of the stored power to be less than $0.4 for each time interval. 
In the case of Stackelberg game without DR scheduling, the probabilities and strategies are the same as section 4.1, 
and the final expected pay off matrixes are: 
 









21.81     21.45       20.37       21.64        21.27        20.19        20.87        20.51        19.42        
21.38        21.81       18.8       21.19        21.62        18.61        19.92        20.35        17.34        
14.81       12.28       9.35        14.16        11.62         8.69          13.41        10.88        7.95         
1
AEP









10.45        10.65        10.23        10.42        10.62        10.2         10.2         10.39        9.97         
8.53         9.65         10.34        8.75         9.86         10.55        8.56         9.67         10.36        
3.04         5.41         4.5          3.29         5.66         4.75         2.67         5.03         4.12         
2
AEP









27.16        26.74        24.36        27.02        26.6         24.22        26.12        25.7         23.32        
26.57        27.13        22.69        26.41        26.97        22.53        25.11       25.67        21.23        
22.26              20        15.55        21.49        19.23        14.78        20.61        18.35        13.9         
1
BEP









58.8         36.2         4.72         54.88        32.28        0.8          49.41        26.81        4.67-        
85.05        63.33        32.81        81.29        59.58        29.05        75.74        54.03        23.5         
117.78       97.38        63.85        113.79       93.4         59.86        107.5        87.11        53.57        
2
BEP
 
Because of limitations for transaction power price, the expected payoff values have been decreased in this game in 
comparison with non-cooperative, unscheduled game (section 4.1). The Nash equilibrium strategies are still the same, 
by the same reasoning: for A to bid higher than marginal cost regardless of its type and for B to bid above, or below 
marginal cost depending if it is type 1 or type 2, respectively.  The pair of strategies “9th column of BEP ” and “7th 
column of AEP ” is the Nash equilibrium of this game. 
4.4.  Stackelberg game with price-sensitive DR scheduling 
In this case, aggregator A schedules its WHs based on the electricity price (Fig. 8) and water consumption (Fig. 9) and 
limitations on the market due to the constraints imposed by the controller must be considered This situation is the 
closest to reality in comparison with the other situations considered. The objective functions are both social welfare 
(keeping the water temperature of the houses in range of F]130,110[ ) and DR scheduling (based on electricity 
price and water consumption). Also, the real market policies (with real limitations) have been applied on this situation. 
In the game, the probabilities and strategies are the same as section 4.2 and the final expected pay off matrixes are: 
 
 









24.98   24.52   23.33   24.78   24.32   23.13   23.78   23.32   22.13   
24.82   25.13   20.92   24.32   24.63   20.41   23.01   23.32   19.11   
16.79   14.16   11.07   16.10   13.47  10.38   15.32   12.68  9.60      
1
AEP









13.11   13.19   12.65   13.05   13.13   12.59   12.79   12.88   12.34   
11.49   12.46   12.99   11.67   12.64   13.17   11.25   12.22   12.75   
6.49    8.67    6.47    6.40    8.58    6.39    5.72    7.90    5.70    
2
AEP  









27.10   26.58   23.41   26.94   26.42   23.25   25.88   25.36   22.19   
26.77   27.18   21.86   26.36   26.77   21.45   25.11   25.53   20.20   
22.60   18.99   14.72   21.86   18.24   13.98   21.01   17.40   13.14   
1
BEP









52.78   30.12   1.36-   48.86   26.20   5.28-   43.39   20.73   10.75-  
78.89  57.100   26.55   75.13   53.33   22.78   69.36   47.56   17.01   
111.47  90.98   56.26   107.18  86.69   51.96   100.96  80.47   45.74   
2
BEP  
The Nash equilibrium strategy is for A to bid higher than marginal cost regardless of its type and for B to bid above, 
or below marginal cost depending if it is type 1 or type 2, respectively. Here, the pair of strategies “9th column of
BEP ” and “7th column of AEP ” is the Nash equilibrium of this game. 
 
Because of the presence of a controller in the Stackelberg games enforcing more market restrictions in the game, 
payoffs of aggregator A and B have been decreased in section 4.3 in comparison with 4.1 and also in section 4.4 in 
comparison with 4.2.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In this work we applied principles of elementary game theory to model competition between DRAs for selling 
power stored in electrochemical storage cells, in a power market with other DRAs as buyers. The situation presents 
itself to competitors as an incomplete information game as any DRA is unable to determine parameters associated 
with cost of operating other player’s equipment. In order utilize the better developed theory of c-games with imperfect 
information we approximated local power demands using known water usage data by assuming that it was the major 
component of the local loads and using public statistical data and a Bayesian approach to derive probability 
distributions for DRA types. We then examined four types of c-game to consider the effects of pure competition (non-
cooperative without WH scheduling) and regulated competition (Stackelberg without WH scheduling). We also 
considered both types of game with the addition of price-sensitive WH scheduling to examine the effect of adding DR 
to the games. The non-cooperative games are quite idealized and would not be practical to implement for various 
reasons explained above, but the Stackelberg games are relatively realistic and provide a possible beneficial alternative 
to currently popular market structures.  
Application of our model to data compiled from the island of Maui served as a case study to analyze the results 
of our model under likely conditions. The results showed that bidding strategies of the DRAs was dependent only on 
parameters associated with hardware and not conditions of the games considered. Addition of price-sensitive DR WH 
scheduling increased payoffs to those DRAs which implemented it compared with those which did not. Payoffs were 
decreased in the regulated (Stackelberg) games compared with non-cooperative purer competition. 
DR WH scheduling conserves energy and the resources spent acquiring it. Competition between DRAs for selling 
power independently of the generating company provides an alternative to the near-monopoly market structure 
currently prominent. Competition for selling power in a market decreases the market price of electricity and allows 
for smaller independent energy produces to enter the market thereby lowering the demands placed on the generating 
company. In our treatment, power stored in batteries is bought from the utility, but if the power was produced locally 
by renewable energy technologies the treatment would be analogous. Increasing penetration of renewable energy 
generating technologies such as photovoltaic systems will have a great effect on gaining independence from our 
combustible fossil-fuel economy and reducing pollution. We believe that proliferation and optimization of DR smart 
grid technologies will play a vital role in building a sustainable power economy. 
The University of Hawaii’s Renewable Energy Design Lab (REDlab) is currently developing hardware systems 
capable of implementing the presented model. Further work will be forthcoming exploring the implications of our 
game-theoretic competition model as an alternative market structure in the state of Hawaii where we currently face 
difficulties with integration of larger numbers of PV systems into the legacy grid. Much more work will be required 
if we are to reach the states 100% renewable energy goals.  
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